Introduction
One of the core questions in the literature on polarity sensitivity is what Ladusaw (1996: 326) calls the Status Question: ' [W] hat is the theoretical status of a structure containing an unlicensed polarity item?' The traditional answer has been that, when a polarity item does not cooccur with an appropriate licensor, as with the classic negative polarity item any in (1b), the result is ungrammaticality -the sentence is either syntactically or semantically ill-formed. (For now, I use the asterisk as a general mark of unacceptability; a larger dossier of judgment marks will be introduced in §5.)
(1) a. Max didn't see any aliens.
b. * Max saw any aliens. Ladusaw (1980) , for example, argues that (1b) is semantically uninterpretable; a polarity licensing requirement disallows the interpretation of this sentence since any does not occur within the scope of a monotone decreasing function, such as the negation in (1a). 1 Linebarger (1980 Linebarger ( , 1987 treats (1b) as syntactically ungrammatical, since it violates a constraint on the Logical Forms (LFs) of sentences containing negative polarity items. More recently, a different view has become influential, one in which the distribution of negative polarity items is derived from a combination of their lexical semantics and general pragmatic principles, e.g. Kadmon and Landman 1993 , Krifka 1991 , 1995 , Israel 1998 , Lahiri 1998 , Chierchia 2004 , 2006 . While these accounts differ in their details, they agree in analyzing a negative polarity item like any as scalar in some way or another; it either makes reference in its denotation to the bottom of a scale (Israel, Krifka, Lahiri) or it widens the domain of quantification (Chierchia, Kadmon and Landman) . Any only occurs in downward entailing environments, then, because its use must have a purpose: it must make a stronger, or more informative, statement. 2 Since, as Ducrot (1973) and Fauconnier (1975) show, inference patterns flip when the scale they are based on occurs in a downward entailing environment, only there will a statement containing any, the lower member of a scale, be more informative than the parallel statement containing a higher member of the scale.
Under the scalar approach, the ill-formedness of unlicensed any in (1b) comes out as a type of pragmatic infelicity, specifically a failure to be informative enough. But, as Giannakidou (to appear) argues, this is not the status that such sentences actually have. They instead seem to be flat-out ungrammatical, an intuition shared even by advocates of the scalar approach (see, for instance, Israel 1998 : 249-250, Krifka 1991 : 180, Chierchia 2006 . Thus, while a scalar analysis may be appropriate for some negative polarity items, it cannot be a universal explanation for their distribution. Instead, Giannakidou (2007) proposes to distinguish between more hard-wired polarity items -which must be licensed grammatically -and expressions whose restriction to some of the same environments is epiphenomenal of how their scalar semantics interact with pragmatic principles (informally, we can say that these are pragmatically licensed).
In this paper, I explore the semantics and pragmatics of let alone, an expression whose distribution parallels that of any in many respects. Removing the negation from the let alone sentence in (2a) results in ill-formedness, as shown in (2b).
(2) Q: What (mountains) has Oswald climbed? A1: Oswald hasn't climbed the Berkeley hills, let alone Mt. Everest. A2: * Oswald has climbed the Berkeley hills, let alone Mt. Everest.
I argue that the distribution of let alone in downward entailing environments can be derived from its lexical semantics -which crucially make reference to a scale -and Gricean principles of cooperative conversation. For let alone, then, in contrast to any, the answer to the Status Question is that unlicensed occurrences are pragmatically infelicitous. The existence of such a negative polarity item thus provides support for a distinction between grammatically-licensed and pragmaticallylicensed polarity items.
The distribution of let alone
Let alone was first identified as a potential negative polarity item by Fillmore et al. (1988) in their original description of the expression. They do not provide a comprehensive list of the contexts in which it shows up, but, drawing on naturally-occuring examples, I show that let alone occurs only in downward entailing environments.
An expression α contained in a sentence φ is in a DOWNWARD ENTAILING ENVIRONMENT iff, for any β, such that β ⊆ α , φ logically entails φ[α/β] (replacing α with β in φ). Thus, in the sentence Liz rarely does not eat any fish for lunch, any occurs in the scope of a monotone decreasing function, the negation expressed by not, but it is not in a downward entailing environment (because of the higher monotone decreasing function rarely). From this sentence, we cannot infer that Liz rarely does not eat any trout for lunch. She may hate trout, and so eat some other kind of fish for lunch almost every day.
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Like any, let alone occurs in the scope of negation (3). It also shows up in the scope of a variety of antiadditive functions (in the sense of Zwarts 1998), which are, of course, also monotone decreasing: the negative adverb never (4), the negative adjective difficult (5), the negative quantifier no one (6), the quantificational determiner every (7), before (8), without (9), and the degree modifier too (10 
By 1928, at most ten people had ever swum the Channel, let alone the Atlantic.
There are a number of other contexts where let alone appears that are not straightforwardly downward entailing, e.g. in the scope of only (13) and barely (14), in the antecedent of a conditional (15), and in the complement of factive predicates like surprised (16) . (13 The fact that these expressions also license any has been the object of much attention in the literature, which, for reasons of space, I cannot review here. I would, however, like to point out some of the progress that has been made in treating these expressions as monotone decreasing. 7 Horn (2002) A: * Tourists climb the Berkeley hills, let alone Mt. Everest.
The generalization thus seems to be that let alone only occurs in downward entailing environments: it is disallowed in upward entailing environments (17) and in contexts where inferences are not allowed in either direction (18-21).
A scalar semantics for let alone
The first step towards deriving let alone's distribution in downward entailing environments is to give it a meaning. I argue elsewhere (Toosarvandani, to appear) that the sentence in (22) expresses a pair of entailments, one of which is an at-issue entailment, while the other is backgrounded: 9 (22) Oswald hasn't climbed the Berkeley hills, let alone Mt. Everest.
a. At-issue entailment: ¬climb(the-berkeley-hills)(oswald)
b. Background entailment: the-berkeley-hills < S mt-everest the most cherished of all values, for violence is perceived as the negation of democracy.
(AHG 587)
These are, of course, among the hardest environments to characterize as downward entailing. 9 This meaning can be derived compositionally using a scheme like the ones that Karttunen and Peters (1979) and Potts (2005) propose for conventional implicatures. Again, see Toosarvandani, to appear for details.
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The at-issue entailment is conveyed by the full clause preceding let alone. The background entailment (what Karttunen and Peters (1979) would call a conventional implicature, Bach (1999) a background entailment, or Horn (2002) an assertoricallyinert entailment) expresses a scalar ordering between the constituent immediately following let alone, which I will call the REMNANT, and the parallel constituent in the clause preceding let alone, which I will call the CORRELATE.
The precise scale involved depends on the context, as it varies with the assignment function that values S, a free variable over scales. In an out-of-the-blue context, the default is a scale of mountains ordered by height or climbing difficult. But this can change: imagine that Oswald is the member of a climbing club that ascends mountains in alphabetical order -first the Berkeley hills, followed probably by a number of other mountains, and then Mt. Everest. In such a scenario, (22) would be felicitous, since the Berkeley hills are again ordered below Mt. Everest (the letter B precedes the letter E). Reversing the order of the correlate and remnant in the same context is not possible: (23) * Oswald hasn't climbed Mt. Everest, let alone the Berkeley hills.
The ill-formedness of (23) At an intuitive level, however, the proposition in (24) seems to follow from the at-issue entailment in (22a): if Oswald hasn't climbed the Berkeley hills (which are quite short), we can infer that he hasn't climbed Mt. Everest (which is much taller). This inference is, of course, not a logical entailment since it is easy to come up with countermodels. 11 If Oswald is an expert mountaineer from Nepal who has never been to North America, then Oswald will not have climbed the Berkeley hills, though he may very well have ascended Mt. Everest. Nonetheless, the proposition in (24) can be derived as a contextual entailment of the Common Ground after it has been updated with the at-issue and background entailments in (22). It thus does not have to be included as part of let alone's asserted content. The background entailment, when added to the Common Ground, can do more than just state a scalar relationship. It can trigger a restriction of the context set to obey the scale, if doing so is relevant to the issue at hand. This follows from the maxim of relevance, which directs the speaker and hearer to make utterances maximally relevant. When the background entailment in (22b) is added, the speaker and hearer draw on world knowledge, in particular the commonsense fact that, if somebody is not able to climb a very easy mountain, they will not have climbed a 10 This was the proposal of Fillmore et al. , who analyze let alone as asserting the conjunction of two propositions, the first of which (22a) Given a lower-bounding 'at least' meaning for the cardinal quantificational determiner, the at-issue entailment is going to entail any parallel statement containing a number higher than one: e.g.
¬ten(mountain)(λx[climb(x)(oswald)])
. Again, we can see the effect of the background entailment by reversing the order of the correlate and remnant, which makes the sentence ill-formed:
(ii) * Oswald hasn't climbed ten mountains, let alone one.
Pragmatic scales, like the scale of mountains, and logical entailment scales can be unified formally, as shown by Hirschberg (1985) , by treating them as partially ordered sets (a set ordered by a relation that is transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric). This relation can either be logical entailment or a context-specific relation.
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The context the let alone sentence occurs in here is a discussion about whether Brian has the money to buy a house for his aging father, an issue that was raised by Mrs. Harper's comment. This discourse can be modeled formally in Roberts' (1996) question under discussion (QUD) framework, in which the information in a discourse is structured by a QUD STACK -a set of questions ordered by their relative informativeness. The QUD stack for the discourse in (25), just before the let alone sentence is proffered, looks like (26). (26) Q1: What does Brian's salary rise to? Q1a: Does Brian's salary rise to buying a house for his aging father?
The IMMEDIATE QUD, the topmost question on the QUD stack, is the polar question Q1a, which asks whether Brian's salary is enough to buy a house for his father.
There is a higher superquestion, the wh-question Q1, that is partially answered by an answer to one of its polar subquestions. Looking now at the at-issue entailment of the let alone sentence in (25) -that Brian can hardly pay his own mortgage -it does not (directly) address the immediate QUD. Instead, it is the answer to another polar question, Q1b: Does Brian's salary rise to paying his own mortgage? When the let alone sentence is asserted, Q1b will be added to the top of the QUD stack. 13 But this new immediate QUD is not completely unrelated to Q1a. Because of the scalar relationship between the correlate and the remnant conveyed by the background entailment -Brian must pay his own mortgage before he can buy his father a house -answering Q1b in the negative also answers Q1b in the negative.
It is also possible for the QUD corresponding to the at-issue entailment to have already been raised explicitly. 14 Consider, for instance, the following example: (27) Several commentators have claimed that on this expedition Gould's party was the first ever to reach the great western bend of the Murray overland from Adelaide. But we cannot be certain that Gould even got as far as the river at all. He himself says he 'spent five weeks entirely in the bush in the interior, partly on the ranges and partly on the belts of the Murray.' Although he had a magnificent view from the top of the Mount Lofty range of the Murray River, winding its course across the flats through a belt of dense dwarf eucalypti, there is no mention of his ever having 13 I have so far ignored the role that focus plays in the semantics and pragmatics of let alone. There are pitch accents located on both the correlate and remnant (which I notate with capitalization): e.g. Oswald hasn't climbed the Berkeley HILLS, let alone Mt. EVerest. In Roberts's QUD framework, focus helps to structure the discourse by presupposing that the immediate QUD is congruent to the sentence containing the focus. Thus, since the polar question corresponding to the focussed correlate in (25) -namely, Does Brian's salary rise to paying his own mortgage? -has not been explicitly mentioned, in order to satisfy the presupposition of focus, it is added to the top of the QUD stack.
14 ) that let alone is a construction that requires the immediate QUD to correspond to the remnant (rephrasing their analysis in QUD terminology). The fact that it is possible for the QUD answered by the at-issue entailment to already be topmost on the QUD stack suggests that this is too strong a requirement. 8 reached its banks, let alone the remote western bend 100 miles away. (HRB 1133) At the beginning of the paragraph, the author introduces the issue of how far Gould and his party got towards the western bend of the Murray River, and then goes on to discuss whether they even reached the banks of the river (presumably, they would have followed the river to their destination). Thus, by the time the let alone sentence is used, the at-issue entailment -that there is no mention of Gould's having reached the banks of the Murray river -corresponds to the immediate QUD:
(28) Q1: What did Gould reach? Q1a: Did Gould reach the western bend of the Murray River? Q1b: Did Gould reach the banks of the Murray River?
Again, while the at-issue entailment only directly answers Q1b, because of the scalar relationship between the correlate and remnant -the banks of the Murray River precede the western bend in the path Gould is traveling -it also answers Q1a: if Gould didn't reach the banks of the Murray River, then he didn't get to its western bend. In sum, because the background entailment conveys a scalar relationship between the correlate and remnant, the overall effect of a let alone sentence will be, for a given wh-superquestion, to entail answers to more than one of its polar subquestions. In contrast, the simple sentence in (29) places a much more limited requirement on its discourse context.
(29)
Oswald hasn't climbed the Berkeley hills.
It only answers the corresponding polar question, Has Oswald climbed the Berkeley hills?

Putting together the pieces
The pieces we need to derive let alone's distribution in downward entailing environments are now in place. Recall that, in the downward entailing examples of § §3-4, the at-issue entailment of Oswald hasn't climbed the Berkeley hills, let alone Mt. Everest gives rise to contextual entailments based on the scalar relationship between the correlate and remnant expressed by the background entailment. This is because inferences reverse when the scale they are based on occurs in the scope of negation -or, more generally, in a downward entailing environment (Ducrot 1973 , Fauconnier 1975 In an upward entailing environment, however, the direction of entailment follows the direction of the scale. Consider the infelicitous let alone sentence in (30), repeated from (2), which conveys the pair of entailments in (31). A: Oswald has climbed the Berkeley hills.
The answer in (32) also conveys that Oswald has climbed the Berkeley hills, but without the additional background entailment. The additional content of a let alone sentence, when compared with the corresponding plain sentence in (32), must serve some sort of conversational purpose -the background entailment must be relevant somehow -or else it will be too informative. This would violate the maxim of quantity, which enjoins conversational participants to make their contributions as informative as required but no more than that (Grice 1975: 45) . 15 It should now be apparent why I have marked the answer in (30) with a #. In such an upward entailing environment, the background entailment does not serve any conversational purpose, since it cannot license any additional contextual entailments. The let alone sentence of (30) thus ends up being pragmatically infelicitous because it violates the maxim of quantity. (From now on, I reserve the asterisk for syntactic or semantic ill-formedness.)
We can compare this account of let alone to Kadmon and Landman's (1993) classic scalar analysis of any. Their account, while not making explicit reference to scales, does make use of the effect of negation, and other monotone decreasing functions, on patterns of inference. The two ingredients of their analysis are a widened meaning for any (33) and a strengthening requirement (34).
(33)
Meaning of any In an NP of the form any CN, any widens the interpretation of the common noun phrase (CN) along a contextual dimension. (Kadmon and Landman 1993: 361) (34)
Strengthening requirement
Any is licensed only if the widening that it induces creates a stronger statement, i.e. only if the statement on the wide interpretation ⇒ the statement on the narrow interpretation. (Kadmon and Landman 1993: 369) Kadmon and Landman propose that any, which they take to express existential quantification, widens the domain of quantification beyond what it would be with an existential quantifier like a(n). By talking about any as widening the domain of quantification, they are essentially ranking any below a(n) on a scale ordered by the subset relation. This is different from let alone, which orders the correlate and remnant on any scale provided by the context. 16 The strengthening requirement that Kadmon and Landman place on any ensures that its widened meaning produces a statement that is stronger than the corresponding one without widening -a constraint which they say '. . .reflects a plausible pragmatic function' (p. 371). This requirement does the same work that the maxim of quantity does in my account of let alone, since unlicensed occurrences of any result in violations of the strengthening requirement: a sentence containing any in an upward entailing environment does not result in a stronger interpretation. 17 To see why, consider the unlicensed occurrence of any in (35), where it occurs in an upward entailing environment. The narrow interpretation of (35), corresponding to a sentence without any, expresses existential quantification over a contextually-restricted set. In an everyday situation, this might be the set of cooking potatoes: there is a cooking potato and we have it. The wide interpretation of (35) is one in which the domain of quantification is larger: there is a potato (that is a cooking potato or another kind of potato) and we have it. The wide interpretation does not entail the narrow interpretation, and so the strengthening requirement is not satisfied. This contrasts with the parallel sentence containing negation, where any occurs in a downward entailing environment: 16 Thinking about things in this way highlights a crucial difference between any and let alone. While any can be construed as forming a scale with a(n), and thus competing with it, let alone itself is never on a scale: it evokes a scale that contains the correlate and remnant. 17 Kadmon and Landman state explicitly (pp. 371-373) that the strengthening requirement is not derived from the maxim of quantity and is lexically associated with any. It is not entirely clear to me, then, what status an unlicensed occurrence of any would have in their system, whether it would be outright ungrammatical or just pragmatically ill-formed.
(36)
I don't have any potatoes. a. Wide: We don't have potatoes, cooking or otherwise. ⇒ b. Narrow: We don't have cooking potatoes. (Kadmon and Landman 1993: 370) Now, the wide interpretation entails the narrow one, since if we don't have cooking potatoes or any other kind of potatoes, it follows that we don't have cooking potatoes.
The analysis I have proposed to account for why let alone is ill-formed in nondownward entailing contexts is similar to that proposed for any by Kadmon and Landman. They both rely on some notion of scalarity and a pragmatic principle that requires that the utterance containing the negative polarity item be stronger or more informative. There is some reason to think, however, that let alone and any do not deserve such similar treatment.
Grammatical versus pragmatic licensing
As discussed in §1, even though the scalar approach was originally proposed for any, recent work suggests that this produces the wrong answer to the Status Question. Giannakidou (to appear) writes (p. 23) that '[p]ositive sentences with any, however, (and the other kinds of NPIs we saw here), are ungrammatical. The intuition has been that grammar does not generate these sentences, and context manipulation does not have an effect on the NPI: *Any boy kissed Amy remains bad even though we can still imagine a possible meaning of it (either some boy or every boy).' The scalar approach predicts that sentences with unlicensed any are pragmatically infelicitous, but such sentences seem somehow to be more strongly ill-formed. I am not as confident as Giannakidou that I have intuitions about whether a given sentence is a * or a #, but there are clear distributional differences between let alone and any that, I think, can tell us whether the scalar approach makes the right predictions for unlicensed occurrences of let alone.
First, there are lexically-specific restrictions on what can license any. As shown in (37), it cannot occur in the scope of the quantificational determiner each, even though it is monotone decreasing.
(37) * Each student who saw anything spoke to the police. (Giannakidou 1998: 12) In contrast, let alone is not subject to arbitrary lexical gaps in the class of licensors. It can occur inside of each's argument, as in (38).
(38) Each shot that is fired, let alone seen to hit its mark, in one zone is expected to bring victory across the whole front. 18 This makes sense if let alone is pragmatically licensed, since it is only predicted to be infelicitous in environments that are not downward entailing. Second, as pointed out by Ladusaw (1980: 206-207) , any cannot precede the expression that licenses it. Consider, for instance, the examples in (39a) and (39b) where any occurs within the scope of negation and a negative quantifier nothing respectively. Nonetheless, the sentences are ill-formed since any precedes its licensor in linear order. 19 (39) a. * Anyone did not talk to me.
b. * Anyone said nothing to me. (de Swart 1998: 178) Let alone, in contrast, very frequently precedes its licensor, as, for example, with negation in (40a) and the negative adjective impossible in (40b).
(40) a. Beecher's reputation as a preacher, let alone as a Man of God, was not universally accepted. (AE6 1421) b. Direct comparisons of effectiveness, let alone cost effectiveness, are therefore impossible. (ALN 513)
Again, this makes sense because the maxim of quantity, which only cares about the informativeness of an utterance, does not make reference to the linear order of the subconstituents of a sentence. Third, the licensing of any is subject to intervention effects (Linebarger 1980 (Linebarger , 1987 . An intervening universal quantifier can disrupt the relationship between the licensor and any, as shown in (41b). (41) a. I doubt that Sue has any potatoes.
b. * I doubt that every housemate of Sue has any potatoes. (Chierchia 2004: ex. 109d) Similar intervention effects do not exist for let alone, which is fine even when every housemate intervenes between it and the negative predicate doubt:
(42) a. I doubt that Sue has vegetables, let alone potatoes.
b. I doubt that every housemate of Sue has vegetables, let alone potatoes.
All that matters is that let alone occur in a downward entailing environment, which, in (42), it does (I doubt that every housemate of Sue has vegetables ⇒ I doubt that every housemate of Sue has potatoes). The fact that there is an intervening universal quantifier is irrelevant.
Finally, as observed by Schmerling (1971) , any need not occur in a downward entailing environment as long as it occurs in the immediate scope of a monotone decreasing function. Such occurrences of any are 'doubly-licensed', since this kind of situation is created by the presence of a higher monotone decreasing function (see also fn. 2): (43) a. She rarely eats anything at all for lunch.
b. She very rarely doesn't eat anything at all for lunch. (Dowty 1994: ex. 46) In (43b), any occurs in an upward entailing environment (She very rarely doesn't eat salmon ⇒ She very rarely doesn't eat fish), but it is still licensed since it occurs in the scope of negation. The use of let alone in a parallel sentence is infelicitous, however:
(44) Q: Does Max eat squid for lunch?
A1: Max rarely eats fish for lunch, let alone squid.
A2: # Max very rarely doesn't eat fish for lunch, let alone squid.
This follows straightforwardly from the pragmatic account I have provided here. Even though, in the second answer of (44), let alone is contained in the scope of a monotone decreasing function, it occurs in an upward entailing environment. Its use is thus infelicitous for the reasons discussed in §5, namely that it violates the maxim of quantity. While these formal restrictions on the distribution of any do not make for an aesthetically appealing analysis, they are at least statable if it is licensed grammatically. Let alone, in contrast, does not show any of the same formal restrictions, suggesting that its distribution in only downward entailing environments derives from a different source, namely whether a given utterance of let alone is informative enough.
7. An aside on positive let alone Before concluding, I would like to consider examples like (45), which given the semantics proposed in §3 expresses the propositions in (45a-b). These positive occurrences of let alone have something in common: the correlate is located higher than the remnant on a contextually-salient scale. In (46), being delighted is a stronger emotion than being pleased; and, in (47), the population of the world is a superset of the population of Ireland. Building on this generalization, I propose that, for those speakers for whom let alone can occur in both negative and positive polarity environments, let alone is ambiguous between high-scalar and low-scalar versions. 20 The background entailment of the high-scalar let alone sentence in (48) would thus convey that the correlate, Mt. Everest, is higher than the remnant, the Berkeley hills, as shown in (48b). High-scalar let alone obeys the same pragmatic principles laid out in §5 for lowscalar let alone. In particular, we can see that (48) does not lead to a violation of the maxim of quantity because the background entailment is being put to good use. With the scalar ordering it expresses, the at-issue entailment will give rise to the additional contextual entailment that Oswald has climbed the Berkeley hills (since, if he has climbed a harder mountain, he has also climbed an easier one). Moreover, the same pragmatic principle ensures that high-scalar let alone does not show up in downward entailing contexts. When, as in (49), it occurs in the scope of negation, the sentence is ill-formed. The explanation here is the same as for low-scalar let alone in upward entailing contexts. Since the negative at-issue entailment contains Mt. Everest, the higher member of the scale of mountains, it is not going to license any additional contextual entailments, and so the background entailment is not relevant to the issue at hand. As a result, the utterance of let alone is overinformative when compared to the simpler alternative in (50).
(50) Q: What (mountains) has Oswald climbed?
A: Oswald hasn't climbed Mt. Everest.
In sum, the reason that high-scalar let alone only occurs in upward entailing environments is the same as for why low-scalar let alone only occurs in downward entailing environments: the let alone sentence would otherwise be too informative. It seems, then, that the polarity sensitivity of let alone, whether it be a negative polarity item or, as for some speakers, a positive polarity item as well, can be derived from its scalar semantics and their interaction with the maxim of quantity.
Conclusion
I have explored the semantics and pragmatics of let alone, an expression that for some speakers is restricted to downward entailing environments. I proposed that let alone's distribution in these environments is epiphenomenal of its lexical semantics, which make reference to a contextually-provided scale, and more general pragmatic principles. This predicts that sentences in which let alone does not occur in a downward entailing environment will be pragmatically infelicitous.
While similar scalar accounts have been proposed for any by Chierchia, Israel, Kadmon and Landman, Krifka, and Lahiri, unlicensed occurrences of any seem to be ill-formed, not for pragmatic reasons, but grammatical ones. I identified four formal restrictions on the distribution of any -involving an arbitrary lexical gap in the class of licensors, a linear order restriction, intervention effects, and double licensing -that let alone does not share. This contrast supports a distinction between grammaticality-licensed negative polarity items, such as any, and those, which like let alone, are pragmatically licensed.
